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fix(identity): one delegation-chain rule for demand-side grants - #1817
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ports adcontextprotocol/adcp#8473 to TrustGrantEvaluator: implicit authority when account.operator and the signer's operator are each the brand or its house; at most two grants from the house's record, every covering first grant a candidate, account.operator the brand, house or first grantee; an unreadable intermediary is an outage only when no chain authorizes; exclusive_grants is exhaustive whatever the scope. Adds GrantAuthorization.source. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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marked this pull request as ready for review
November 2, 2026 18:33
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Ladon verdict: Approve
Approve — clean port of adcp#8473 (single delegation-chain rule for demand-side grants) into TrustGrantEvaluator.
What I checked:
- trust.py delegation logic (~84 net lines):
first_links()groups covering first grants by registrable grantee under the account.operator-on-chain constraint; concurrent intermediary fetch bounded bySemaphore(8); firsts recomputed at post-fetch decision time; outage consulted only when no chain authorizes (fail-closed toSERVICE_UNAVAILABLE);exclusive_grantsnow exhaustive across scopes. - Public-API/semver:
sourceis an additive optional field;fix:prefix is correct and the behavior shift is documented in the PR body and migration doc. No public-export removal/rename/required→optional flip, so nofeat!:/BREAKING CHANGE:needed. - Tests: 48 hash-pinned vendored delegation-chain vectors with full outcome coverage plus three targeted unit tests. CI gates stay armed — no disabled tests, no blanket ignores.
Risk assessment: high_risk is true only because src/adcp/signing/trust.py matches src/adcp/signing/** as a (modified) file. Per the risk rules, a modification with no medium-or-higher finding is presumed safe — not an escalation trigger on the flag alone. gated_paths is false, no author-team gate, no prior decision.
No blocking or medium findings. Decision table rows 1–8 do not fire; falls through to row 9.
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Ports the spec erratum adcontextprotocol/adcp#8473 (one delegation-chain rule for demand-side grants, erratum to ratified R6) to
TrustGrantEvaluator, and vendors its cross-SDK vectors. Mirrors adcontextprotocol/adcp-client#3452.Rule changes (
src/adcp/signing/trust.py)account.operatorand the signer's operator are each the brand or its house, in any combination. The new cases are a brand account with the house as signer, and a house account with the brand as signer.account.operatormust be the brand, the house, or the first grant's grantee. Every covering first grant is a candidate, where before only the grant toaccount.operatorwas. Distinct intermediary records are read concurrently, at most 8 at a time. An unreadable intermediary counts as an outage (SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE) only when no other chain authorizes.exclusive_grants: trueon the house's record now makesgrants[]exhaustive whatever the scope. Before, it applied only to the scopes some grant named. Without the flag, an uncovered claim goes toseller_authorization.GrantAuthorization.source("implicit","trust","seller"or"legacy";Nonewhen denied), matchingresult.sourcein TS.Behavior changes for adopters
exclusive_grantsrecord whose grants name only other scopes now denies withgrant_absentinstead of deferring toseller_authorization.test_an_operator_outside_the_brand_and_its_house_still_needs_a_grantis updated to match.Vectors
tests/fixtures/delegation-chains/delegation-chains.jsonholds all 48 vectors fromstatic/test-vectors/delegation-chains.jsonat adcp merge commitd397b8ea(the #8473 merge, unchanged on main since).PINNED.jsonrecords the commit and content sha256, and a test checks the hash. The content is identical to the TS SDK's vendored copy, which differs only in formatting. Against the previous implementation, 26 of 48 vectors fail.Tests
tests/test_delegation_chain_vectors.py: one test per vector, plus checks for outcome coverage and the pinned hash.tests/test_experimental_identity.py: an unreadable intermediary next to an authorizing chain, the outage-only case, andexclusive_grantsregardless of scope.🤖 Generated with Claude Code